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The overthrow of empires and the succession of new govern-
ments and states, which followed in the wake of the recent war,
have in the past few years presented to the courts of all countries
closely touched by this period of upheaval numerous cases involv-
ing the status of foreign governments and their property in other
countries, and the validity abroad of their acts. At the same
time the marked extension of government activity into fields
hitherto regarded at least in countries of English law as sacred
to private enterprise has, in intensifying the conflict of govern-
ment with private interest both at home and abroad, stirred novel
questions of government immunity.
An American makes a contract with a foreign government,
which advances money to him for the purposes of the contract.
The American defaults and pockets the advances. The foreign
government sues this American here and is met with the answer
that it has no standing in the courts of the United States because
the State Department has seen fit to ignore officially the fact of
that government's existence. An American citizen dies resident
abroad in a country whose government is unrecognized in Wash-
ington. The widow, appointed administratrix in that foreign
country, sues here to recover assets of the decedent's estate, but
stumbles over the legal obstacle that the appointment as ad-
ministratrix cannot be recognized here so long as the foreign
appointing power is not "recognized" by the executive here. The
growing conflict of public and private interest is typified by the
common case of a trading vessel libelled for salvage service, col-
lision damage or repairs; a foreign government appears as claim-
ant of the vessel and asserts absolute immunity of its ship from
process. Such examples are typical of the many cases which
have been engaging the attention of courts in the past ten years.
A re-examination of the principles and reasoning of the decisions,
and of the facts forming the common background, of such cases
may not be amiss.
How far shall the demands of "international comity" and of
"sovereign immunity" exempt a government from responsibility
in law, at home and abroad, for its acts; how far shall ifs acts at
home obtain full recognition and validity abroad? Professor Bor-
chard aptly points out that "it requires but a slight appreciation
of the facts to realize that in Anglo-American law the individual
citizen is left to bear almost all the risks of a defective, negligent,
perverse or erroneous administration of the State's functions, an
unjust burden which is becoming graver and more frequent as
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the Government's activities become more diversified and as we
leave to administrative officers in ever greater degree the de-
termination of the legal relations of the individual citizen." '
. We shall exclude from direct consideration the question of the
sovereign's immunity from suit and process in its own courts and
the sovereign's statutory consent to be sued at home, except in
so far as such topics shed light upon the problems of the foreign
government's status and acts in courts of another country.
I.
Neither in England nor America does suit lie against the sover-
eign directly in its own courts, without its consent. This im-
munity or non-responsibility of the Crown or State has been
viewed as a necessary corollary of the personal sovereignty of
the king, of the non-suability of the sovereign in person.2 Thanks
to the researches of Ehrlich3 and others we may now doubt the
soundness of this view, and incline rather to the belief that our
present-day doctrine of immunity is an outgrowth of the royal
prerogative. American courts and lawyers have swallowed
whole the doctrines supposed to be the peculiar outgrowth of
kingship, divine right and royal prerogative. This is the more
peculiar when we consider that while in England sovereignty is
still expressed as that of the "Crown", in the United States the
sovereignty is that of the "government" or the "state", although
it is clear that our Federal government is one of limited powers
delegated by the people of the several states in whom therefore
ultimate sovereignty must reside. The Austinian concept is re-
fledted in the words of Justice Holmes:
"A sovereign is exempt from suit not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical
ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends".
There is a growing army of modern critics3 of the doctrine of
I Borchard, Government Liability in Tort (1924) 34 YAI.U LAW Jo~tnrAL,
1.
2 Cf. Borchard, supra note 1, at 2; Maguire, State Liability for Tort
(1916) 30 HARv. L. REv. 20; Laski, The Responsibility of The State In
England (1918) 32 HARV. L. REv. 447.
3 6 Oxford Studies In Social anzd Legal History (1921) "Proceedings
Against The Crown (1216-1377)" passim.
4 Kawananakoa, v. Polyblank (1906) 205 U. S. 349, 353, 27 Sup. Ct. 52G,
527.
-'Cf. Borchard, Maguire, Laski, suipra note 2. Cf. Dickinson, The U-
recognized Government or State In English azd Amcrican Law (1923) 22
MIcH. L. REv. 29; Lord, Admiralty Claims Against The Govcrnmcat
(1919) 19 CoL. L. REv. 467; Hayes, Private Claihms Against Foreign
Sovereigns (1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 599; Krabbe, The Modern Idca of the
State reviewed by Dewey, in (1923) 23 CoL. L. REv. 400; Duguit, Lazv in
the Modern State (1919) passim; Borchard, Goverenta Rc"pon-ibility
in Tort-A Proposed Stattory Reform (Aug., 1925) A. B. A. Joyu- 405.
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non-responsibility of the state in the present-day law of England,
the Dominions and America. It is now bey~nd doubt that in our
day we shall see increasing encroachment in countries of English
law upon the hitherto sacred domain of sovereign non-responsi-
bility, and an approach to the continental theory of responsibility
of the modern sovereign in its own courts.
The basic problems of "immunity" of the home sovereign and
of the foreign government are widely different in nature. Im-
munity of the sovereign from suit at home flows from the his-
torical notion that the sovereign is above the law, whereas the
"immunity" of the foreign sovereign proceeds from considera-
tions of practical expediency in friendly international intercourse0
It is perhaps to be regretted that the term "immunity" is invoked
in both types of cases.
When we come to consider the position of the foreign sovereign
in the courts of England and America, we find at once the play
of a wholly different set of ideas, sometimes cloaked in terms
similar to those used regarding the home sovereign, but for the
most part prompted by considerations of practical wisdom. It
is uniformly held that the foreign sovereign, either in the person
of the ruler or as the government, is immune from direct suit
in the courts of another country.7 This is certainly true when
the foreign sovereign is "recognized" as such by the home govern-
ment; and although some suggestions have lately been made (and
rejected) that an unrecognized foreign sovereign may be sued,8
it seems doubtful whether such a doctrine will, or indeed should,
gain headway.
The basis of the immunity of the foreign sovereign is the
purely practical argument that to permit process to issue would
"vex the peace of nations". To state the rule is to establish its
viability. The rule is perhaps the clearest example of "comity",
that often quoted and over-worked term. The foreign sovereign
is immune from suit in the courts of another country, not be-
cause of any right in the sense of historical or analytical juris-
prudence, but solely because by the process of judicial self-limi-
tation in the interest of friendly intercourse among nations we
judge it inexpedient to issue process of any sort or to sit in judg-
6 Cf. Weston, Actions Against The Property of Sovereigns (1919) 32
Hbnv. L. REv. 266.
7 Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover (1849) 2 H. L. C. 1; Wads-
worth v. Queen of Spain (1851, Q. B.) 17 A. & E. (N. S.) 171; Migholl
v. Sultan of Johore (1894) 1 Q. B. 149; Strousborg v. Costa Rica (1880,
C. A.) 44 L. T. 199; Manning v. State of Nicaragua (1857, N. Y.) 14
How. Pr. 517; Hassard v. United States of Mexico (1899, Sup. Ct. Spec.
T.) 29 Misc. 511, 61 N. Y. Supp. 939, aff'd (1903) 173 N. Y. 645, 66 N. E.
1110; Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, supra note 4. Cf. Porto Rico v. Rosaly
(1913) 227 U. S. 270, 33 Sup. Ct. 352.
8 Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (1922, 2d
Dept.) 202 App. Div. 421, 195 N. Y. Supp. 472.
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ment. Comity has of course been long since vested with the
dignity of a "rule of international law"., Whether or not a
"right" exists in favor of the suitor against the foreign sovereign
sought to be hailed into court, it is fruitless to inquire, for as
Justice Holmes has observed:
"Legal obligations that exist but cannot be enforced are ghosts
that are seen in the law, but that are elusive to the grasp".,1
The absolute immunity of the sovereign from direct personal
suit abroad, save with its consent, will probably endure for many
years; but the immunity of the sovereign from suit at home is
being weakened by legislative consent, by the critical onslaught
of writers, and by the growing disfavor towaid the doctrine in
the courts.
The natural converse of the rule of immunity of the foreign
state is equally clearly established, that our courts are by custom
freely open to suit by a foreign sovereign as plaintiff.21 Intel-
lectually and logically we might refuse the privilege-practically
we cannot, save in a world of closed frontiers.
For the same reasons of practical expediency it follows that
our courts will not sit in judgment upon the acts and conduct at
home of foreign states when called in question before our courts
in litigation to which the foreign state is not a party 2 Title to
property located within the territorial limits of a foreign country
is conveyed or determined by act, executive or judicial, of that
country; subsequently the validity of that determination of title
is questioned in litigation in our courts. If the foreign sovereign
is recognized, its acts "import absolute verity", and our courts
will not look further into the question. A foreign government
requisitions a vessel under its flag for its own purposes; the va-
lidity of that requisition cannot be considered elsewhere. "The
courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of a
government of another, done within its own territory".1 3
A recent decision applies the rule forcibly. In The Oliver
9 The Paquete Habanat (1900) 175 U. S. 677, 20 Sup. Ct. 290.
'0 The Western Maid (1922) 257 U. S. 419, 42 Sup. Ct. 159.
11 The Sapphire (1870, U. S.) 11 Wall. 164; Russian Government v.
Lehigh Valley Railroad Company (1919, S. D. N. Y.) 293 Fed. 133; Vata-
seur v. Krupp (1878) 9 Ch. Div. 351.
Canada Southern Railroad Company v. Gcbhard (1883) 109 U. S. 527,
3 Sup. Ct. 363; RicauQ v. American Metal Co. (1918) 24G U. S. 304, 39
Sup. Ct. 312; Underhill v. Hernandez (1897) 163 U. S. 250, 18 Sup. Ct.
83; American Banana Company v. United FruiY t Co. (1909) 213 U. S. 347,
29 Sup. Ct. 511; Oeten v. Central Leather Co. (1918) 246 U. S. 297. 3S
Sup. Ct. 309; The Invincible (1814, C. C. D. Mass.) 2 Gall. 29; Hczuit v.
Speyer (1918, C. C. A. 2d) 250 Fed. 367; Earn Lare S. S. Co. v. Suther-
land S. S. Co. (1918, S. D. N. Y.) 254 Fed. 126; Secretary of State v.
Kamachee (1859) 13 Moo. P. C. 22; Buron ,. Denman (1848) 2 Excb. 167;
Doss v. Secretary of State (1875) L. R. 19 Eq. 509.
L3 Underhill v. Hernandez, supra note 12.
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American Trading Co. v. The Government of the United States
of Mexico, et al.,14 an American corporation brought suit in the
state courts of New York against the then unrecognized Mexican
Government and the Mexican National Railway administration
for breach of a contract made with that government in Mexico.
The action was begun by attachment of Mexican Government
property. The government appeared specially, objected to the
jurisdiction of the court, and removed the action to the Federal
court. Following the recognition of the Obregon government, the
motion to vacate the attachment and to dismiss the action was
granted on the familiar ground of immunity. On appeal the dis-
missal was sustained by the Circuit Court of Appeals. The most
significant point of the decision concerns the plaintiff's contention
that as the contract in question was made and the acts of seizure
of property and embargo complained of were done by the Mexi-
can Government in its operation of the Mexican state railways,
a trade as distinguished from a governmental function, the gov-
ernment was not entitled to the customary immunity. The court
declined to accept the plaintiff's contention and said:
"It is said that the Mexican Government in operating the Na-
tional Railways of Mexico is engaged in trade and in a non-
governmental enterprise. This view of the matter we do not ac-
cept. It is a fact, of which we take judicial notice, that in the
leading countries of Europe, as well as in Canada, it is the prac-
tice of governments to own and operate the railways. This is
not regarded by them as engaging in trade but as the perform-
ance of a fundamental governmental function. It evidently is so
regarded in Mexico, and while in the United States the railways
are not owned and operated by either the State or Federal govern-
ments we are not justified, on that account, in holding that the
Mexican Government is engaged in trade and not performing a
governmental function in operating the National Railways of
Mexico".
If the foreign government performs a function or does acts,
they are part of the business of that government, and, it is not
for the courts of another country to hold that such functions
and acts are not government business. Distinctions accepted
with us locally, between those activities of the state which are
or are not governmental in essence cannot properly be invoked
against a foreign state. It alone is judge of its own functions
and activities; and the mere fact of their existence and perform-
ance by the foreign state should conclusively place them above
question abroad. We may of course ascertain that the foreign
sovereign in fact had jurisdiction over the property in question
or the subject matter of the original litigation," or that the origi-
nal litigation abroad was conducted in a manner calculated to
14 1924, C. C. A., 2d Circuit.
15 The Santissinia Trinidad (1822, U. S.) 7 Wheat. 283; Second Russian
Insurance Co. v. Miller (1924, C. C. A. 2d) 297 Fed. 404.
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render substantial justice to our own citizen who was a party to
iti'6
Not infrequently a court is in doubt as to the existence in fact
or the standing in international intercourse of an alleged foreign
"sovereign" which is a party to an action or whose acts are set
up as affecting questions at issue. X claims title to property
acquired by executive act of a certain faction of another country.
Do the acts of that faction import absolute validity abroad as the
acts of the sovereign? A vessel libelled in our courts is claimed
as the public property of a foreign sovereign; is that sovereign
the recognized government of that country? While the court
does not require proof or extra-judicial suggestion that Nicaragua,
Russia and Turkey exist as nations of people under some form of
independent government, the court clearly may require proof
whether the faction of General A or of General B is in fact the
government of some Central American republic and recognized as
such by our government, may require proof whether the Soviet
government is or is not recognized by us de facto or de jzure as
the successor of previous recognized regimes, and whether we
have resumed diplomatic relations with Turkey which were
broken off during the war without formal declaration of hos-
tilities.
A court is not the proper body or functionary either to deter-
mine such questions of fact or establish such relationships of inter-
national intercourse. These are tasks for the executive branch
16 Cf. Hilton v. Guyot (1894) 159 U. S. 113, 16 Sup. CL 139. In Eng-
land a personal judgment of a foreign country is held conclusive evidence
of the merits of the case, attackable only for fraud or want of juris-
diction. "It is against the law of nations not to give credit to the judg-
ments and sentences of foreign countries, till they are reverzed by the law,
and according to the form, of those countries wherein they were given.
For what right hath one Kingdom to reverse the judgment of another?
And how can we refuse to let a sentence take place till it is reverzed?
And what confusion would follow in Christendom, if they should cerve us
so abroad, and give no credit to our sentences"; Cottington's Caco (18,
Ch.) 2 Swan. 326; Tarleton v. Tarleton (1815, K. B.) 4 DL & S. 20;
Martin v. Nicolls (1830, Ch.) 3 Sim. 458.
In the United States the majority rule is the same. Fishcr v. Fieldirg
(1895) 67 Conn. 91, 34 Atl. 714; Dunstan v. Higginz, (1893) 138 N. Y.
70, 33 N. E. 729; Covency v. Phiscator (1903) 132 Mch. 253, 93 N. W.
619; Law v. Hansen (1895) 25 Can. Sup. Ct. 69. But the Supreme Court
holds that a foreign judgment will be given conclusive effect only when
reciprocal treatment is there accorded to American judgments. Hilton v.
Guyot, supra.. Accord: Johnston v. Compagnic Gincrale Trazcatlantiqnc
(1924, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 123 Misc. 806, 20G N. Y. Supp. 413.
In France a foreign judgment against French citizens will be given
effect for execution only following an examination into the merits, upon
exeqatur. But even in France a foreign judgment may be held conclu-
sive, without such re-examination, as a decision of fact. Cf. Bartin, La
Jugement Etranger Consider6 Comme Un Fait (1924) Joun. Du DnoiT
INT. 857.
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of the government, and it is so universally recognized." The
court when in doubt as to such matters will always receive, or
of its own initiative request, the advice of the executive, and be
bound by it. If the Foreign Office advises that recognition as a
de facto government has been accorded to the Soviet Republic,
the Court of Appeal is bound accordingly; and full validity is
automatically accorded to acts of that government. 1 If the State
Department advises that the revolutionary faction headed by
General B has been recognized as the de jure government of a
Latin-American country, our courts accept such executive determi-
nation as final.19
In Russian Govt. v. Lehigh Valley R. R.20 action was brought
by the accredited representative of the Kerensky regime, Mr.
Bakhmatieff, as the recognized successor of the Czarist govern-
ment; the defendant objected that both governments had ceased
to exist, that the Soviet r6gime was in power and that the action
could not be continued. The court denied the defendant's motion
to dismiss, pointed out that it was bound by the executive's con-
tinued recognition of Mr. Bakhmatieff and his successor as the
sole representative of the Russian State, and declined to go be-
hind the executive determination. We shall have occasion to ob-
serve later, however, that in the absence of executive recognition
of a foreign government, the courts may be forced to some con-
sideration or a determination of the existence of what is asserted
to be a foreign government in fact, its sfatus, or the effect of its
acts for the purposes of the litigation. Where the executive has
granted recognition, the courts will not deny or attack it, directly
or collaterally. Where the executive has denied recognition, the
courts will not arrogate to themselves the function of according
it de jure, yet they may be compelled to give effect and validity
to acts of an unrecognized de facto government.
II.
Unrecognized foreign governments may be before the courts as
suitors, as defendants, as third party claimants or as alleged
sovereigns whose acts may directly affect the issues of the case.
'17 Foster v. Neilson (1829, U. S.) 2 Pet. 253, 307; Garcia w. Leo (1838,
U. S.) 12 Pet. 511; Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co. (1839, U. S.) 13 Pet. 415;
Kennett v. Chambers (1852, U. S.) 14 How. 38; Holden v. Joy (1872,
U. S.) 17 Wall. 211, 242; In Re Baiz (1890) 135 U. S. 403, 10 Sup. Ct.
854; Jones v. United States (1890) 137 U. S. 202, 11 Sup. Ct. 80; Agency
of Canadian C. & F. Co. v. American Can Co. (1918, S. D. N. Y.) 253 Fed.
152, (1919, C. C. A. 2d) 258 Fed. 363, 368; Republic of Peru v. Peruvian
Guano Co. (1886) L. R. 36 Ch. Div. 489; Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus
(1888) 38 Ch. Div. 348, 356, 359.
is Luther v. Sager (1921) 3 K. B. .332.
'9 Underhill v. Hernandez, supra note 12; Oetien v. Central Leather
Co., supra. note 12.
20Supra note 11; (1923, S. D. N. Y.) 293 Fed. 135.
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In Wulfsohn v. Rusiaw-Socialist Federated Soviet Rcpublic,2 1 the
Soviet Government was sued for alleged conversion of personal
property. Upon a motion to set aside service of summons by
publication, the court of first instance in denying the motion, held
that the defendant, not being either a recognized government or
a domestic corporation, was a foreign corporation and as such
amenable to suit.2 2 The Appellate Division sustained this novel
theory of corporate entity, but the Court of Appeals held that the
defendant was immune from suit, saying:=
"The result we reach depends upon more basic considera-
tions than recognition or non-recognition by the United States.
Whether or not a government exists clothed with the power to
enforce its authority within its own territory, obeyed by the
people over whom it rules, capable of performing the duties and
fulfilling the obligations of an independent power, able to enforce
its claims by military force, is a fact, not a theory. For it
recognition does not create the state although it may be desirable.
So only are diplomatic relations permitted. Treaties made with
the government which it succeeds may again come into effect.
It is a testimony of friendly intentions. . . . They may not
bring a foreign sovereign before our bar, not because of comity,
but because he has not submitted himself to our laws. Without
his consent he is not subject to them. Concededly that is so as
to a foreign government that has received recognition.
But whether recognized or not the evil of such an attempt would
be the same. 'To cite a foreign potentate into a municipal court
for any complaint against him in his public capacity is contrary
to the law of nations and an insult which he is entitled to resent'.
(De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171). In either ease
to do so would 'vex the peace of nations'. In either case the
hands of the state department would be tied. Unwillingly it
would find itself involved in disputes it might think unwise. Such
is not the proper method of redress if a citizen of the United
States is wronged. The question is a political one, not confided
to the courts but to another department of government. When-
ever an act done by a sovereign in his sovereign character is
questioned it becomes a matter of negotiation, or of reprisals or
of -war."
The decision seems eminently sound in result and in the main
course of its reasoning. To say, however, that the unrecognized
foreign sovereign is immune from suit without its consent, "not
because of comity, but because he has not submitted himself to
our laws", or "because an independent government is not answer-
able for its acts to our courts", seems to be whipping the devil
around the stump.
A year later the same court observed,24 "Juridically a govern-
2 1 The report of the decision of the Court of Appeals in this case may
be found in (1923) 234 N. Y. 372, 138 N. E. 24.
22 (1922, Sup. 6t. Spec. T.) 118 Misc. 28, 192 N. Y. Supp. 282.
23 Supra note 21, at 375, 376, 138 N. E. at 25.
24 Sokoloff v. National City Bank (1924) 239 N. Y. 158, 165, 145 N. E.
917, 918.
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ment that is unrecognized may be viewed as no government at
all, if the power withholding recognition chooses thus to view it.
In practice, however, since juridical conceptions are seldom, if
ever, carried to the limit of their logic, the equivalence is not
absolute, but is subject to self-imposed limitations of common
sense and fairness, as we learned in litigations following our
Civil War".
We may if we like subject foreign government-owned property
to suit in our courts, as we have done in some admiralty cases; that
we do not do so when the suit is in name against the foreign gov-
ernment owner is purely for reasons of comity and not because of
any fiction of submission or non-submission, or because there is
anything of magic in the conception of an "independent govern-
ment". In the Wulfsohn decision the court was primarily con-
fronted with the correctness of the ruling of the lower courts that a
foreign unrecognized government was a "foreign corporation"
within the meaning of the Code provisions; the rejection of that
notion was the first consideration; and it is at least a fair ground
of speculation whether invocation for the benefit of Moscow of the
fair name and repute of Comity, undisguised, was not a trifle ab-
horrent.
At the present time it appears that an unrecognized foreign
government may not bring suit in the courts of England or
America. Lord Eldon expressed great doubt25 whether the City
of Berne, of the new de facto but unrecognized government of
Switzerland, might maintain an action. Since then the question
does not seem to have been presented or decided in England.
In Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic v. Cibrario,2 it
appeared from the pleadings that the plaintiff, the Soviet Govern-
ment, had advanced certain monies to defendant under a con-
tract to supply that government with films. It was alleged that
defendant had misappropriated some of these funds; and an ac-
tion for an accounting was instituted in New York, presumably
the only place where personal service and adequate relief could
be obtained. In denying the right to sue, Judge Andrews, speak-
ing for the court, placed the decision upon the ground that comity,
"that reciprocal courtesy which one member of the family of
nations owes to the others", follows upon recognition and fails
in the absence of recognition. "A foreign power brings an action
in our courts not as a matter of right. Its power to do so is
the creature of comity. Until such government is recognized by
the United States, no such comity exists. . . . We may add
that recognition and consequently the existence of comity is
25 City of Berne v. Bank of England (1804, Ch.) 9 Ves. Jr. 347; of.
Dolder v. Lord Huntingfield (1805, Ch.) 11 Ves., Jr. 283.
26 (1923) 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259.
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purely a matter for the determination of the legislative or execu-
tive departments of the government". -
It is submitted that although the right of any foreign govern-
ment to sue, or to be exempt from suit against it in our courts,
is clearly a matter not of right but of privilege decreed by comity,
and although the courts must look to the legislature or the execu-
tive for formal recognition or the withholding of it, the want of
comity does not logically or of necessity flow from the want of
recognition. To hold that an unrecognized foreign government
may sue as such in our courts is not the equivalent of diplomatic
recognition. A more satisfactory basis must be found, if at all,
in considerations of the avowed policy of that foreign govern-
ment in relation to our own public policy as determined by the
various branches of our government, or in the practical con-
venience of courts in determining whether the alleged sovereign
is in fact the ruling government of that country, or who is the
governing entity of that state. On the one hand not every fac-
tion of a revolution-torn country can by its own flat at home
and solemn pleading in a foreign court expect to be accepted for
the full face value of its hopeful assertions, and so be entitled to
the privilege of suing as a political entity. On the other hand,
it may be that a governing body, as yet unrecognized by the
chancelleries, is in truth the sovereign power of that country, and
that the fact of its existence and undisputed power is susceptible
of definite, uncontrovertible proof. Under such an hypothesis,
the denial of the right to sue may result in as much future em-
barrassment to the executive, for example in negotiations for the
resumption of diplomatic relations, as would be subjection of a
recognized government to suit over its protest. If the plaintiff
is in fact a political entity and is sovereign in its own domain,
the want of formal executive recognition as such abroad does not
make it any less sovereign at home. Why then should a court
abroad refuse to accept it for what it is-an entity in fact? :3
In The Penza,'9 a libel in admiralty by the Soviet government,
Judge l'Manton in dismissing the libel pointed out that not only
was the Soviet r6gime unrecognized but that the former r6gime
of Russia still had a diplomatic representative in the United
States and recognized by the State Department. The same ruling
was made upon similar facts in The Rogdayj,? The rulings were
clearly sound, for to have allowed suit by the Soviet government
under such circumstances would have been a refusal to abide by
27 Ibid. at 258, 262, 139 N. E. at 262.
28 See Connick, The Effect of Soviet Decrees in American Courtg (1925)
34 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 499.
29 (1921, E. D. N. Y.) 277 Fed. 91.
30 (1920, N. D. Calif.) 278 Fed. 294, 279 Fed. 130.
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the executive determination that the Kerensky regime was the
government of Russia.
It seems exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the
reasoning of the Cibrario and Wulfsohn decisions. The actual
results, however, might be approximated by confining the reason-
ing of each to demonstration that in neither case was there any
entity before the court, as plaintiff in the Cibrario case, as de-
fendant in the Wulfsohn case. Stress might have been laid on
the practical difficulties of proving the official acts of the Soviet
government in its behalf or the name and function of its officials
on whom process might be served by publication against it. It
is to be regretted that the court in these opinions attempted to
make comity the child of recognition, and to disguise comity in
vague language about an unsubmissive foreign government, es-
pecially when, as in the Wulfsohn case, the action was one to sub-
ject to process and judgment property within the jurisdiction,
There are numerous cases in which courts have taken cog-
nizance of the existence of unrecognized governments and have
given full effect to their acts. In United States of America v.
Prioleau,31 it appeared that goods were sent to England under a
contract between a private citizen and one of our Confederate
States. The Union government sued to recover the goods. In
denying the right of suit the British court held that the contract
could not be regarded as void and the United States must adopt
the contract and take such rights under it as the de facto, un-
recognized government of the rebel states might have claimed
under it.
In Yrisarri v. Clement, 2 the plaintiff, in suing for libel, claimed
that the defamatory matter had been uttered concerning his ac-
tivities on behalf of Chile, of which he claimed to be the duly
appointed diplomatic representative. To his offer to prove that
Chile was a state, it was objected that the court must take judi-
cial notice that Chile still belonged to Spain. Chief Justice Best
said:
"If a foreign state is recognized by this country, it is not
necessary to prove, that it is an existing state; but if it is not
so recognized, such proof becomes necessary. . . . I take the
rule to be this---if a body of persons assemble together to pro-
tect themselves, and support their own independence, and make
laws, and have Courts of Justice, that is evidence of their being
a state".
In 1903 the Supreme Court of the Transvaal, following the
Boer War, examined and gave full effect, in two cases involving
questions of title to property, to the laws and orders of the de
3, (1865, Ch.) 2 H. & M. 559.
3'2 (1825, N. P.) 2 C. & P. 223.
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facto Boer government, as yet unrecognized by the British gov-
ernment.33
After the Civil War our courts were called upon not infre-
quently to consider the validity and effect of laws, orders and
decrees of the Confederate States. Where such acts were in pur-
ported derogation of the rights of loyal citizens, the courts re-
fused to give validity to them.34 Where on the contrary such acts
did not directly aid in the prosecution of the war by the Con-
federacy or were not in derogation of rights acquired by citizens
of the Northern States, the courts recognized these acts as im-
porting full validity. Thus one residing in Confederate territory
during the war was held- not responsible to the owner of prop-
erty destroyed by the defendant under compulsion of Confederate
military forces. Contracts for payment of debts in Confederate
money, the investment of trust funds in Confederate securities,
Confederate money as good consideration for a contract, the
creation by act of a Confederate legislature of a corporation
capable of suing to recover property have all been upheld.-^
Exaction of custom duties at the port of Castine by the British
military forces in control there during the War of 1812 was up-
held37 in the Supreme Court in an action brought subsequently
by the American government to recover payment of American
duties on the same goods. In Keene v. M'Donough,3 an adjudi-
cation of title to lands in Louisiana made by a Spanish tribunal
after the cession of Louisiana to the United States but before
the United States had actually taken possession was sustained as
"the judgment, therefore, of a competent Spanish tribunal, hav-
ing jurisdiction of the case and rendered whilst the country, al-
though ceded, was, de facto, in the possession of Spain and sub-
ject to Spanish laws. Such judgments, so far as they affect the
private rights of the parties thereto, must be deemed valid."
In all these cases the court took cognizance of and gave full
effect to the purported sovereign acts of the government actually
exercising power and jurisdiction over the territory, the property
or the persons affected, although in each instance the existence
or the lawful jurisdiction of the foreign power was not recog-
33Van Deventer v. Hancke (1903, Sup. CL) Transvaal L. R. 401; Lem-
iuhl v. Kock (1903, Sup. Ct) Transvaal L. R. 451.
34 Williams v. Bruffy (1877) 96 U. S. 176.
5 Ford v. Surget (1878) 97 U. S. 594.
30 Thorington v. Smith (1869, U. S.) 8 Wall. 1; Delmas v. Merchan's
Mut. Ins. Co. (1871, U. S.) 14 WalL 661; Planter's Bank v. Union Bank
(1872, U. S.) 16 Wall. 483; United States v. Insurance Companies (1874,
U. S.) 22 Wall. 99; Baldy v. Hunter (1898) 171 U. S. 388, 18 Sup. CL
890.
7 United States v. Rice (1819, U. S.) 4 Wheat 246.
38 (1834, U. S.) 8 Pet. 308. Accord: Macleod v. United States (1913)
229 U. S. 416, 33 Sup. Ct. 955.
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nized by the other branches" of the home government. An un-
recognized foreign government does not necessarily exist in a
judicial vacuum. To deny unqualifiedly the right or privilege of
the unrecognized ftvernment to sue in our courts and at the same
time to give full effect to some at least of its acts is logically in-
consistent and unnecessary in practice.
Where, however, the acts of the unrecognized government are
deemed to impair the rights of citizens of a friendly power or
of the country whose courts are asked to give or deny effect to
those acts, recognition of their validity will not be accorded. In
Luther v. Sagor the lower court refused " to recognize the con-
fiscation of British-owned goods by the then unrecognized Soviet
regime; and it may be safely assumed that the decision would
have been sustained on appeal if the Soviets had not in the mean-
time been recognized.
In James & Co. v. Second Russian Insurance Co.,40 an action
against a Russian company doing business in New York upon a
policy of reinsurance, it was held that notwithstanding Soviet
decrees dissolving the company and vesting its assets in the Rus-
sian state, the company was amenable to local process. "The
decree of the Russian Soviet government nationalizing its in-
surance companies has no effect in the United States unless, it
may be, to such extent as justice and public policy require that
effect be given". In fact the defendant company was still en-
gaged in active business in New York, long after the decrees
were put into effect in Russia. The court, by Cardozo, J., was
careful to observei "We do not say that a government unrecog-
nized by ours will always be viewed as unexistent by our courts
though the sole question at issue has to do with a transaction
between the unrecognized government and a citizen or subject
of a government by which recognition has been given". The
court further held that although the responsibility of the com-
pany in Russian courts or under Russian law might be terminated
by a Russian decree, this could not operate to terminate its re-
sponsibility abroad, "if assets of the debtor were available for
seizure in the jurisdiction of the forum". Observing that this
was a decree of confiscation, "neither comity nor public policy
requires us to enforce a mandate of confiscation at the behest of
such a government to the prejudice either of our own citizens or
of those of any friendly power seeking justice in our courts".
In Pelzer v. United Dredging Co.42 the widow of an American
citizen, who died intestate a resident of Mexico, was appointed
39 (1921) 1 K. B. 456.
40 (1925) 239 N. Y. 248; cf. NoTEs (1925) 38 HARv. L. REV. 816.
41239 N. Y. at 255, 256, 257.
42 (1922, ,Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 18 Misc. 210, 193 N. Y. Supp. 675, aff'd
200 App. Div. 646, 192 N. Y. Supp. 676.
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administiatrix by a Mexican court, and brought an action in the
New York courts to recover on notes executed by an American
corporation payable to the deceased. The government function-
ing in Mexico was at that time unrecognized in the United States.
On motion the action was dismissed on the ground that no legal
effect could be given to the appointment of plaintiff as adminis-
tratrix by a Mexican court. Such a conclusion seems quite in-
defensible, provided adequate proof can be adduced of the acts
of the foreign government.
There is another type of case in which courts properly refuse
to give any effect to acts alleged to be those of an independent
government, or refuse to recognize that in fact an alleged govern-
ment is independent or is the successor of a government still
recognized by the executive department. Portions of a nation's
territory sometimes attempt to break away from the parent gov-
ernment and often successfully set up a local government which
in fact exercises complete sovereignty in the revolting territory.
Until the revolting power, however, is recognized as a new state,
either by the foreign parent state or by our own government,
our courts cannot directly or indirectly give any validity to its
acts or recognize its existence as a government.13 To do so would
infringe upon the function of our executive or legislative depart-
ment to determine who is the sovereign of any given territory,
or would belie the official claims of the recognized foreign power
to continued sovereignty over all its original territory.
Once the foreign government has been recognized, full validity
is given-- to its acts performed prior to recognition. even to acts
which are in question in litigation pending at the moment of
recognition. It is necessary to give retroactive effect in this re-
spect to the act of formal acknowledgment of independent sover-
eignty.
Luther v. Sagor- was an action involving title to goods claimed
by plaintiffs as the original owners in Russia against the defend-
ants claiming title through seizure of the goods by the Soviet
regime and purchase from it. The suit was brought, and the
decision of the lower court was given, before any recognition of
43 Gelston v. Hoyt (1818, U. S.) 3 Wheat. 246; Rose v. Himely (1803,
U. S.) 4 Cranch, 241; United States v. Hutchings (1817, C. C. Richmond)
2 Wheel. Cr. C. 543; Clark v. United States (1811, C. C. A. 3d) 3 Wash.
C. C. 101; cf. Williams v. The Suffolk Ins. Co., supra note 17; The Rogday
(1920, N. D. Calif.) 279 Fed. 130.
44 1Murray v. Vanderbilt (1863, N. Y.) 39 Barb. 140; Undcrhlfl ,. Her-
nandez, supra note 12; Oetien v,. Central Leather Co., supra note 12;
Ricaud v. American Metal Co., supra, note 12; Oliver American Trading
Co. v. Mexico (1924) Fed. Consent to suit may be withdrawn at any
time, even as to existing litigation. Beers ,. Arkaansas (1857, U. S.) 20
How. 527; Railroad Co. v. Alabama (1879) 101 U. S. 832; EX Parte State
(1875) 52 Ala. 231.
4 5Supra note 38; (1921) 3 K. B. 532.
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the Soviets by Great Britain. The lower court gave judgment
for the plaintiffs and refused to give any effect to the Soviet
decrees. While the case was on appeal, de facto recognition was
accorded the Soviet government and the judgment of the lower
court was reversed. Warrington, L. J., stated that the act in
question "must in my opinion, be entitled to the same respect as
the acts of a sovereign state, whether done before or after recog-
nition".
We thus find the broad lines established that an unrecognized
government (1) may not be subjected to direct suit over its ob-
jection, either because it has no existence as a legal entity4 or
if it is a definite entity, political or legal, because of comity dis-
guised under the axiom that an independent sovereign is not
answerable for its acts to a foreign court; (2) it may not sue
in courts abroad because comity, which aldne permits such suit,
exists only when formal recognition has been accorded; (3) acts
of such a r6gime will be in general accorded full effect and va-
lidity, where they do not involve spoliation or do violence to the
public policy of the country where they are called in question,
nor deny the necessary effect of existing formal intercourse; (4)
recognition, once accorded, is retroactive to import conclusive
validity to all acts done prior to recognition.
It may be suggested that further consideration of the essential
requirements of comity may lead to a revision of the present view
that an unrecognized government may not bring suit abroad, and
that determination of the problem of giving effect to acts of an
unrecognized government, when that state is not a party to liti-
gation, must be left to a judicious weighing of the balance of
considerations in each instance. This would involve a considera-
tion of the practical result upon the respective rights and in-
terests of the parties of giving or withholding recognition of
validity, a contrasting of the public policy of the foreign state
in such matters with that of our own government, and the prac-
tical convenience of proof of the de facto existence of the foreign
stdte, its decrees, laws and judgments.
III.
How shall the fact of sovereign ownership or interest be es-
tablished, and the plea of immunity properly presented to the
court? If the suit is brought directly against the foreign state
or personal sovereign, by designation of the defendant in terms
which leave no doubt that a government or sovereign is being
46 Cf. Nankivel v. Omsk All Russian Government (1923) 237 N. Y. 150,
142 N. E. 569, in which the Court of Appeals held that suit would not
lie against an alleged political entity which by common knowledge had




sued, it seems clear that the immunity may properly be asserted'-
by the defendant's attorney, even without official suggestion from
the executive department of the jurisdiction of the suit, or vith-
out the necessity of the foreign state laying the claim through
diplomatic channels. It would seem that even though the action
is not against the sovereign in name but in interest, a suggestion
by its attorney as ainicus curiae should be sufficient; and such
has been the practice in several well-considered cases.
In Osborn v. The Ban)k of the Unitcd States, Chief Justice
Marshall observed :"'
"An independent sovereign cannot be sued and does not appear
in court. But a friend of the court comes in and, by suggestion,
gives it to understand that his interests are involved in the con-
troversy. The interests of the sovereign, in such a case, and in
every other where he chooses to assert them under the name of
the real party to the cause, are as well defended as if he had been
a party to the record".
In Mason v. Intercolonial Raihvay, 9 an attorney, appearing as
anticus curiae, filed a suggestion for dismissal of the action and
an affidavit of a Canadian government officer setting forth the
foreign government ownership of the funds attached. On this
suggestion the action was dismissed.
The executive branch of the government mayn however, sua
sponte, make a suggestion of immunity to the court, it would
seem (although such procedure would probably not be common
practice), both because the executive is more likely to be first
informed of the situation by representations of the government
aggrieved, and because there is no reason for the executive to
assume that the foreign government will necessarily refuse con-
sent to suit. The government which is sued will in the majority
of cases at once make representations to the executive and request
that appropriate steps be taken to apprise the court of the de-
fendant's objection to suit. In this country the State Department
thereupon requests the Attorney General to designate the nearest
United States attorney to appear in court at an appropriate oc-
casion and inform the court that in view of the friendly relations
maintained by the United States with the defendant government,
it is in the interest of the continuance of such relatiofis that
process be vacated.
Greater difficulty arises when the proceeding is in rcm, particu-
larly in our admiralty courts. Since with us the ship is still
regarded7' as an entity separate and distinct from her owner, it
47 Wulfsohn v. Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Rcpublic, cupra note
21; Oliver Co. v. Mexico, supra note 14.
4s (1824, U. S.) 9 Wheat. 738, 870.
49 (1909) 197 Mass. 349, 83 N. E. 876.
5 Hassard v. United States of Mexico, supra note 7.
51 Cf. The Pesaro (1921, S. D. N. Y.) 277 Fed. 473, and authorities there
cited.
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is but natural that our courts should require clear proof that the
ship or property is government-owned and that immunity be
affirmatively claimed by the proper person in an appropriate
manner. These requirements are now more strictly applied than
formerly; and this fact affords striking evidence of the tendency
to limit immunity wherever possible.
In The Maipo,5 2 a suggestion of the ownership of the vessel by
the Chilean government was made directly to the court by the
Chilean charg6 d'affaires; and immunity was requested. It was
granted, and the court observed that it was not necessary for the
suggestion to be made by an official of our government. In The
Adriatic8 the British Ambassador filed such suggestion and re-
quest directly in the court, through counsel; and the Circuit
Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, affirmed the decree dismissing
the libel.
In The Attualila,.4 however, the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit had denied immunity to an Italian government
vessel, because the State Department in filing a suggestion of the
fact of requisition of the vessel and operation by the Italian gov-
ernment did not specifically request its release, even though the
master of the vessel did object before the court to the assumption
of jurisdiction. And in The Florence H." immunity was denied
to a vessel operated by the French government under charter
from our own government, upon the ground, inter alia, that there
was no suggestion from the State Department before the court.
The Supreme Court laid down certain rules in Re Muir"° for
appropriately presenting the claim. The case came to the court
on a petition for mandamus or prohibition to prevent the Dis-
trict Court from exercising further jurisdiction in rem over a
vessel operated by its private owner for the British government
under the latter's requisition. Counsel for the British Embassy
had presented to the District Court a suggestion to that effect,
and the master had also objected to jurisdiction. The petition
for relief was denied by the Supreme Court on the ground that
the suggestion and claim had not been appropriately presented.
The court said there were three ways in which this could be done
prbperly: (1) for the government to appear in the suit, propound
their claim and raise the jurisdictional question; (2) for its
recognized representative to appear and take the same steps;
(3) for the foreign government to make diplomatic representa-
tions to this end.
In The Pesaro, 5 the decree of the District Court dismissing
52 (1919, S. D. N. Y.) 259 Fed. 367.
53 (1919, C. C. A. 3d) 258 Fed. 902.
54 (1916, C. C. A. 4th) 238 Fed. 909.
5 (1918, S. D. N. Y.) 248 Fed. 1012.
506 (1921) 254 U. S. 522, 41 Sup. Ct. 185.
57 (1921) 255 U. S. 216, 41 Sup. Ct. 308.
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the libel against the Italian government-owned ship was reversed,
on direct appeal, on the ground that under the rule enunciated
in the Muir case, the direct suggestion of the Italian Ambassador
to the court did not properly raise the claim.
In Tratisportes Maritnos do Estado,-3 the court held that the
consul-general of a foreign government had no standing in court
to raise the question of exemption; and in the Gul Djcmza,' that
a naval officer of a foreign government in charge of a vessel
belonging to that government but chartered to a private carrier,
likewise had no such authority. In the latter case the govern-
ment concerned was that of Turkey, as yet unrecognized by the
United States after diplomatic relations were broken off in 1917,
but without declaration of war. The Spanish Ambassador, repre-
senting Turkish interests in the United States aild recognized in
that capacity by the State Department, had made the suggestion
and request directly to the District Court, and had later suggested
to the State Department that it suggest to the Attorney-General
that the latter ask the vessel's release. To that the Department
had replied:
"The Department has made it a practice carefully to refrain
from taking any action which might constitute an interference
by the authorities of this government in private litigation, even
though such litigation may in some way involve merchant vessels
owned by a foreign government. I therefore regret to say that
the Department, in the light of the information before it, does
not feel that it is in a position to take the action which you
suggest".
In the Pesaro,60 the State Department wrote the Court:
"It is the view of the Department that government-owned mer-
chant vessels or vessels under requisition of governments whose
flag they fly employed in commerce should not be regarded as
entitled to the immunities accorded public vessels of war. The
Department has not claimed immunity for American vessels of
this character. In cases of private litigation in American ports
involving merchant vessels owned by foreign governments, the
Department has made it a practice carefully to refrain from
taking any action which might constitute an interference by the
authorities of this government in such litigation".
The situation thus presented is barren of results for the for-
eign government which desires to present its claim of immunity.
(1) Neither the master of the ship nor the consular representa-
tives have authority to assert exemption. (2) The ambassador,
through counsel, may not appropriately raiseo' the claim by di-
rect suggestion to the court. (3) The ambassador must through
Us (1922) 260 U. S. 151, 43 Sup. Ct. 15.
r9 (1924) 264 U. S. 90, 44 Sup. Ct. 244.
60 Supra note 50, at 479.
61 Cf. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, sazpra note 47, where thi3
procedure was specifically approved.
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the State Department request immunity. (4) If the State De-
partment refuses to exercise its good offices, the foreign govern-
ment will be helpless, at least short of appearing formally in court
and laying claim to the vessel as a prerequisite to asserting its
immunity directly. Yet this procedure of formal appearance as
a suitor may be with considerable propriety declined by the for-
eign government on the ground that it is equivalent to a recog-
nition of the right of the court to assert jurisdiction over its
property, for an alleged tort or breach of contract committed
within the jurisdiction of the foreign claimant.
Some solution more logical and more practical must be worked
out. At the present time local counsel for a foreign government
must advise the ambassador that nothing short of diplomatic
representation and a suggestion emanating from the State De-
partment can now be safely relied upon . 2 Yet the foreign gov-
ernment may be met by a refusal of the State Department to
ask immunity in its behalf or to transmit to the court the sover-
eign's request for immunity for its trading vessel. The foreign
state may refuse to go near the court in any manner, by general
or special appearance, suggestion of counsel or otherwise. As
immunity must be affirmatively claimed and may be waived, the
ship will be condemned and sold. We shall then have a very
pretty case to trouble the chancelleries and vex the "time-honored
friendship of the two peoples". It is submitted that the State
Department and the courts cannot go their separate paths, the
one unmindful of the views of the other. 3 If the courts will now
listen only to the executive, the latter cannot refuse at least to
transmit requests. If the Department washes its hands of the
whole business, short of libel of a war-ship, the courts cannot
refuse to listen to the ambassador. The rulings and practices of
the two branches of the government must gear together in order
that the foreign state's claim to immunity may at least be pre-
sented to the Court for determination upon the merits.
62 In Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter and Carpenter (1924, D. C.
Conn.) 300 Fed. 391, the plaintiff corporation, the government railway
administration of Sweden, claimed immunity as against a counterclaim.
Judge Learned Hand denied the immunity, holding that under the rule
laid down by the recent Supreme Court decisions, where the party before
the court is neither the sovereign nor his ambassador, the claim will not
be recognized unless asserted through diplomatic intervention.
03 See COMMENTS (1925) 35 YALE LAW JoU RNAL, 98.
